July 5, 2013 To appear in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. (Routledge) 4 however: interestingly, they are suppressed when we deliberate, and surge when we must act (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . Optimistic illusions are not helpful when we are figuring out what to do, but they serve a useful function in supporting confident action after a course of action has been decided. Those who are concerned about the reliability of epistemic intuition might wonder about the pressures towards accuracy or illusion shaping intuitive judgments about knowledge. Given that intuitive mechanisms are generally adaptive, a better understanding of the ordinary functions of epistemic intuition would help us answer this question.
Why do we have epistemic intuitions? The literature on mental state attribution identifies a variety of reasons why it is valuable for creatures like us to form rapid impressions about the presence or absence of knowledge. Animals living in social groups can better compete for resources (and keep control of them) when they are aware of whether their competitors do or do not know where the resources are located (Clayton, Dally, & Emery, 2007; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001 ). More generally, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (Whiten & Byrne, 1988) has stressed that animals in complex social groups gain competitive advantages from mindreading: animals who are able to keep track of each others' underlying mental states do not simply expect the same surface patterns of behavior, but can more accurately anticipate changing behavior across changing circumstances. Specifically competitive settings have worked to elicit impressive performance in mental state attribution from nonhuman primates and young children (Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008) . In more cooperative settings-for example, in discriminating cues from 'helpers', some of whom knew where food was locatednonhuman animals have performed poorly (Povinelli, Rulf, & Bierschwale, 1994) . There is Whether agreement in the common core of intuition itself counts towards the evidential value of intuition in epistemology depends in part on the extent to which epistemology is guided by intuitions about these simple cases. One might argue that philosophical work on knowledge only concerns subtle cases that are not immediately decidable on the basis of common and uncontroversially shared intuition. Subsequent sections will take a closer look at the question of whether intuitions do reliably decide subtle cases, but however that issue is decided, it is plausible that at least some less subtle cases still matter to epistemology. For example, one place that core intuitions have had a significant impact is in the battle with skepticism: if most epistemologists are inclined to resist skepticism, this is perhaps in part because it seems intuitive that we do have knowledge in ordinary cases of clear perception and sound inference. Epistemological skepticism has, however, raised a deep challenge to the reliability of intuition even in these cases, a challenge that merits further examination.
The challenge of skepticism, and the new experimentalist challenge
Skeptical philosophers typically acknowledge that we sometimes have the intuitive impression that someone has knowledge. Classical Pyrrhonian skeptics can be read as taking no position on the reliability of such impressions, and as simply counseling that judgment be withheld on all matters. By contrast, the typical contemporary skeptic argues July 5, 2013 To appear in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. (Routledge) 8 approximation of knowledge, and might still count as having some reliability in the sense of conveying useful information.
Interestingly enough, at a decisive point in his argument Unger himself relies on intuition: in defending the notion that complete certainty is indeed required for knowledge,
Unger appeals to the intuitions we have when the key terms are emphasized. He observes that even if we initially find it acceptable to say "He knows that it is raining, but he isn't certain of it," we have a "feeling of contradiction" in response to "He really knows that it is raining, but he isn't actually certain of it" (Unger, 1971, 216 The new experimentalist challenge to the reliability of epistemic intuitions is not a generic skeptical challenge: experimental philosophers are not simply arguing that knowledge is impossible, nor are they arguing that intuitive capacities generally have unreliable or meaningless deliverances (Weinberg, 2007) . Their claim instead is that we have empirical evidence for the unreliability of epistemic intuition. A review of this evidence is in order.
Demographic variation
It has been claimed that epistemic intuitions vary according to ethnicity (Weinberg et al., 2001 ) and gender (Buckwalter & Stich, 2011 Many trusted sources of evidence have some arbitrary element: sensory perception, for example, typically has some margin of error, or some band within which judgments will vary arbitrarily. Experimentalists cannot criticize epistemic intuition simply on the grounds that not everyone reaches the same judgment at all times; a demand for perfect unanimity would be problematic for the sources of evidence that empirically--motivated research programs need to take for granted. Systematic variation correlated with ethnicity or gender is also not in itself a reason to discount a source of information. For genetic reasons, women may have slightly better color vision, as a group, than men do; for reasons having to do with visual climate, some ethnic groups have slightly better eyesight than others. On certain subtle color discrimination tasks, there will be variation correlated with gender: a larger majority of women than men will get the right answer. However, such a finding should not incline either group to conclude that their color judgments lack evidential value. Demographically correlated variation in a capacity is consistent with its general reliability. We are forced to choose between our intuitions and those of some other group only if the relevant intuitions are deeply at odds with each other.
To date, there is no robust evidence that the epistemic intuitions of different demographic groups are deeply at odds with each other. Although the Weinberg et al.
(2001) results have been heavily cited, it is doubtful that they are robust. The suggestion that South Asians tend not to feel Gettier case intuitions is especially puzzling; as early as the 8 th century, South Asian philosophers developed cases very much like Gettier's-for
intuitions. Beyond the age of four, males and females in the non--clinical population do not seem to differ in the way they distinguish knowledge from ignorance and false belief (Charman, Ruffman, & Clements, 2002) . To argue that men and women differ in their intuitions, Buckwalter and Stich actively solicited reports from experimental philosophers who had encountered significant gender differences in their experiments on intuitions.
However, we should expect this method to turn up some significantly different results simply by chance: on the assumption that there is no significant relationship between gender and intuition, most studies will show men and women responding similarly, but some will show women outperforming men, and others will show men outperforming women. To establish that men and women really differ, one would need to disclose the total pool from which the disparities were drawn, to show the proportion of cases in which differences were found; Stich and Buckwalter have not done this.
The quality of the relevant studies also matters: much emphasis has been placed on a conference presentation presenting a gender difference in Gettier case recognition (Starmans & Friedman, 2009) . Subsequent efforts to replicate that finding have failed (Seyedsayamdost, ms--a). Indeed, the authors of the 2009 presentation themselves regard their earlier finding as unrepresentative of male and female performance, and in a more recent and more detailed study they report no gender differences in epistemic intuitions (Starmans & Friedman, 2012) .
It is very unusual to find large gender differences on cognitive tasks. After conducting a comprehensive review of 46 meta--analyses on gender differences, Janet Hyde summarized the available data as supporting the "gender similarities hypothesis," according to which "males and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological Hauser (2010) report just such cross--gender similarity in terms of intuitive moral judgments: they collected reports of intuitive moral judgments from over eight thousand subjects and found that while there was statistical significance in differences in the way that members of different genders responded in most scenarios, the overall effect size was "extremely small" (270).
It is possible that there is some robust, large and yet--to--be--discovered demographic variation in epistemic intuitions, but the thought of this mere possibility does not constitute a positive empirical reason to consider epistemic intuitions unreliable.
Contextual variation
In their (2008) look at the idea that differences in intuition can be accounted for by differences in expertise.
Training in philosophy
Is there evidence that laypeople's intuitions are systematically different from those of philosophers? Starmans and Friedman (2012) Starmans and Friedman posit expertise as one possible explanation for this discrepancy. For example, they consider the possibility that "philosophers might be very practiced in thinking about the myriad ways in which the truth of belief might rest on luck" (10). Starmans and Friedman do not find this explanation very plausible, however, since they claim that due to the quantity of questions and the way that the scenarios were set up, the luck element was "obvious" to participants (10). In a similar vein, Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, and Alexander (2010) argue that there is a problem with favoring philosophers' intuitions on the grounds of their expertise, where expertise is being "able to efficiently pick out just the epistemologically--relevant features of hypothetical cases." This characterization is so nondescript, they caution, that it will be hard to know whether one actually possesses expertise, or if it really makes any difference. According to Weinberg et Starmans and Friedman cite Williamson (2005) as evidence that philosophers "with near unanimity" believe that subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge (9); however, July 5, 2013 To appear in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. (Routledge) cases, a response which would be supported by Starmans and Friedman's results.
Starmans and Friedman did not actually test philosophers on the problematic cases in which laypeople unexpectedly attributed knowledge; instead, they support their contention that laypeople and philosophers would differ on these cases by noting structural similarities between these cases and some existing Gettier cases in the philosophical literature. One particular worry about the cases for which Starmans and Friedman found anomalous results is that they involved strange narratives in which an item is replaced with an identical duplicate behind a subject's back, and in at least some cases it is somewhat unclear whether the replacement might have been managed precisely to ensure that the state of the world after the substitution matches the subject's original state of mind. It is not obvious that these really are Gettier cases, or that philosophers would respond to them differently than the laypeople, or that any discrepancies in lay responses to these cases arise from a different lay grasp of knowledge as opposed to differences in how attentively laypeople and philosophers are construing these hard--to--follow cases. Further research may help us understand whether philosophers really are different in their intuitive responses for these cases, and if so, why.
Some philosophers have suggested that philosophers' intuitive responses may be shaped by their intellectual climate (e.g., Gendler & Hawthorne, 2005) . It is not clear, as a matter of empirical fact, whether this is true: they suggest that negative intuitions about Fake Barn cases may be traceable to some peculiarly philosophical pressures, but these intuitions have also been found in laypeople (Nagel et al., 2013; Wright, 2010) . If philosophical climates do shape epistemic intuitions, this may or may not be a good thing. notwithstanding their conformity to his earlier theory. As far as we now know, it may even be that one's epistemic intuitions are wholly insulated from theoretical commitments in epistemology, as judgments in syntax appear to be insulated from theoretical commitments in syntactic theory (Sprouse & Almeida, 2012; Sprouse, Schutze, & Almeida, 2013) . Further research could improve our understanding of the relationship between epistemological theory and epistemic intuition; meanwhile, the hypothetical possibility that intuitions could be shifted by theory is not in itself a reason to doubt the reliability of epistemic intuition.
Disagreement among philosophers
Philosophers sometimes report disagreement about particular cases. In epistemology, there has been particular controversy over whether subjects in "Fake Barn"--type cases lack July 5, 2013 To appear in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery, ed. (Routledge) 
